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Shahar v. Bowers:
That Girl Just Didn't Have Good Sense!
Cynthia J. Frost*
I. Introduction
Ms. Robin Shahar was employed with the Office of the Attor-
ney General of Georgia during the summer preceding her final
year of law school, 1990.1 In September 1990 the Attorney Gen-
eral offered her a position as Staff Attorney to begin after her law
school graduation, and she accepted the offer. 2 During this time,
Ms. Shahar was planning a wedding with her partner, who is also
a woman. 3 The wedding was to be performed by their rabbi under
the auspices of their synagogue and was to take place in late July
of 1991. 4 The Attorney General learned of the wedding plans and
terminated the employment offer in July, citing her upcoming
marriage as the reason for the termination.5
Shahar brought action against the Attorney General, claim-
ing violation of her rights of intimate and expressive association,
freedom of religion, equal protection and substantive due process.6
The district court entered summary judgment for the Attorney
General, and Shahar appealed.7 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed
summary judgment on equal protection, due process and free ex-
pression of religion grounds and remanded the case for reconsid-
* J.D. expected 1999, University of Minnesota Law School. B.A. 1986,
Augustana College. I want to thank Robin Shahar for her commitment to a life of
integrity and her perseverance through years of litigation in an attempt to achieve
justice. Ms. Shahar's courage to live unapologetically in the face of such tremen-
dous consequences is an inspiration to those of us who struggle to find the courage
to live and love and work with integrity. Thanks also to editors Jill Robertson and
Joe Thiegs, and to the Law and Inequality staff and editorial board.
1. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1100 (lth Cir. 1997), cert. denied,





6. See Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ga. 1993), affd, 114 F.3d
1097 (llth Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998).
7. See id.
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eration of the associative interest claims.8 The Attorney General
requested a hearing by the circuit court en banc. 9 The panel's de-
cision was vacated, 10 and the en banc court affirmed the district
court's summary judgment for the defendant." The court found
that the interests of the Attorney General, as employer, out-
weighed Ms. Shahar's constitutional interests.12
This case raises several important issues. First, what infer-
ences may be appropriately drawn from the existence of gay and
lesbian relationships and from expressions of those relationships?
How do such inferences effect presumptions and burdens of proof,
and to what extent are these inferences determinative? If infer-
ences may be unquestionably drawn and used to deny the constitu-
tional rights of lesbians and gay men, what must be done to ensure
adequate protection and democratic participation for sexual mi-
norities? This Article critically examines the Shahar decision and
asserts that the court allowed impermissible inferences and im-
properly dismissed Shahar's constitutionally protected rights.
Part II briefly surveys the current legal status of sexual minorities
and introduces relevant constitutional issues. Part III states the
holding and reasoning of the case. Part IV critically examines the
court's conclusions, focusing on the inferences the court draws
from Shahar's relationship and how those inferences are used to
discredit her and to afford complete deference to the Attorney
General. Finally, the Article suggests legislative and judicial pro-
tections for sexual minorities.
II. Legal Issues Affecting Sexual Minorities
A brief survey of legal issues affecting sexual minorities in-
cludes three distinct areas: the criminalization of sexual relations,
anti-discrimination measures and legal recognition of same-sex
relationships. 3 Sodomy laws are used against gay and lesbian
citizens14 not only through criminal prosecution, but to justify dis-
8. See Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 1995), vacated, Shahar v.
Bowers, 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996).
9. See Shahar, 78 F.3d at 500.
10. See id.
11. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1098.
12. See id.
13. See MORRIS B. KAPLAN, SEXUAL JUSTICE: DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP AND
THE POLITICS OF DESIRE 14-15 (1997). Hate speech could also be included but is
beyond the scope of this Article.
14. The author intends the use of the word "citizen" to express the ideal of full
and equal participation of persons in a democratic society, as expressed by Morris
B. Kaplan in Sexual Justice: Democratic Citizenship and the Politics of Desire.
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crimination and deny their constitutional rights.'5 Several states
have enacted measures against discrimination, yet the majority of
jurisdictions do not prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. And while domestic partnership is recognized in some
locales, lesbian and gay couples are denied the legal status of mar-
riage and ensuing rights and benefits. "Lesbian and gay citizens..
• [are] subject to pervasive legal disabilities and vulnerable to social
and economic retaliation for the exercise of civil rights."'16 These le-
gal disabilities erode the constitutional and statutory protection
available to gay and lesbian citizens.
A. The Criminalization of Sexual Relations
The criminalization of sexual relations has been accom-
plished through laws against sodomy, also referred to as crimes
against nature, 17 or "the abominable crime of buggery."' 8 As of
1961, every state in the union proscribed sodomy.19 Over the next
two decades, many states adopted the Model Penal Code,20 which
does not proscribe sodomy, thereby repealing their sodomy laws. 2'
Other states have repealed sodomy statutes expressly, 22 and can-
didates recently debated that issue in Georgia, 23 the state in which
the former Attorney General Michael Bowers and Ms. Shahar re-
[E]quality for sexual minorities includes a lot more than just freedom
from harassment by criminal laws and police. Lesbian and gay oppression
results from pervasive legal disabilities that sanction and reinforce social
discrimination and subordination. Indeed, the legal and social status of
homosexuals in our society amounts to a condition of second-class citizen-
ship. Democratic citizenship extends far beyond formal equality before
the law and access to abstract rights. Citizenship is a political status;
equality entails the ability to participate on the same terms as others in
collectively shaping the conditions of common life.
KAPLAN, supra note 13, at x.
15. See William B. Rubenstein, The Stonewall Anniversary: 25 Years of Gay
Rights, 21 HUM. RTS. Q., Summer 1994, at 18, 19.
16. KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 227.
17. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1411 (West 1989); IDAHO CODE § 18-6605
(1997); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, § 34 (Law. Co-op); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1997).
18. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law Co-op. 1985).
19. See Rubenstein, supra note 15, at 19.
20. Model Penal Code § 213.2 & commentary at 364, 366-67 (Official Draft & Re-
vised Comments 1980).
21. See Rubenstein, supra note 15, at 19.
22. The Rhode Island legislature amended section 11-10-1 of the Rhode Island
General Laws. S. 2819, H. 7585 (R.I. 1998).
23. See Christina Nifong, Georgia Adultery Debate Shows Shift in Morality:
Candidate's Admitted Affair Stirs Debate on Old and Unenforced Laws Against
Sodomy, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, June 27, 1997, at 3 (describing the move-
ment toward removing adultery, fornication and sodomy statutes); Throw Out
State's Archaic Sex Laws, ATLANTA CONST., June 17, 1997 (advocating the repeal of
adultery, fornication and sodomy laws).
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side. Sodomy laws remain on the books in eighteen states: five of
these states proscribe only same-sex sodomy;24 thirteen prohibit
sodomy across the board. 25 The laws allow for sentences ranging
from thirty days to life imprisonment. 26
Sodomy has various definitions. Some definitions refer to the
gender of the parties involved; 27 others refer only to particular
acts. 28 Some definitions apply only to homosexual 29 couples,30
while others apply only to heterosexual couples in certain activi-
ties.31 with an animal.32 Under this definition, oral sex between
male-female couples constitutes sodomy, whereas oral sex between
24. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3501, -
3505 (1995); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 554 (1996) (Unnatural or Perverted Sexual
Practices), construed in Schochet v. State, 580 A.2d 176 (Md. 1990) (holding that the
statute did not apply to consensual, noncommercial heterosexual activity); MO. ANN.
STAT. § 566.010, .090(1) (West 1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 886 (West 1983 &
West Supp. 1999) (Crime against nature), construed in Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105,
1109-10 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (holding the statute unconstitutional as it applied to
heterosexuals but expressly not reaching the question of its application toward homo-
sexuality).
25. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-60, -65(a)(3) (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-
1411 to 1412 (West 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 800.02 (West 1992 & West Supp. 1999);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1997); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986); MASS. LAWS.
ANN. ch. 272, § 34 (Law. Co-op. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.158 (West
1991); MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1994); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-177 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-403 (1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Michie 1996).
As this Article was in the publication process, the Georgia Supreme Court de-
clared Georgia's sodomy law, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1996 & Michie Supp. 1998),
unconstitutional. See Powell v. State, No. $98A0755, 1998 WL 804568 (Ga. Nov.
23, 1998); see also infra note 275 and accompanying text (reflecting on the signifi-
cance of the Powell decision).
26. See supra note 25. In Georgia, sodomy was a felony and was punishable by
1 to 20 years imprisonment. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2.
27. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1712 (3d ed. 1992); 2 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1193 (1980).
28. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 968 (6th ed. 1983).
29. The word "homosexual" is used intentionally throughout this Article in two
distinct contexts. When the language of the court has focused on "homosexuals,"
the author has used the same word to retain the tone of the opinion. The author
also uses the symmetrical language of "homosexuals" and "heterosexuals" in an
attempt to emphasize the asymmetrical treatment these groups receive.
30. See, e.g., 2 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra note 27, at 1193. Other sources
define sodomy more broadly as unnatural or abnormal sexual intercourse without
reference to the sex of the parties, but further clarify that sodomy is especially sex
between male persons. See, e.g., 15 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 925 (2d ed.
1989); WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN LANGUAGE 1385 (1968).
31. See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, supra
note 27, at 1712 (regarding oral sex).
32. See id.
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male-female couples constitutes sodomy, whereas oral sex between
same-sex couples does not.33 The definition does not include les-
bian erotic activities of any kind.34
Sodomy also has various legal definitions. 35 The Georgia sod-
omy law did not apply to sex between women until it was amended
in 1968.36 The most recent version of the law proscribed oral and
anal sex without reference to the gender of either party. 37
Although by definition there is no correlation between sod-
omy and sexual orientation, the word "sodomy" has become a meto-
nym for "homosexual."38  Judicial opinions have stated that
"[s]odomy is an act basic to homosexuality" 39 and have referred to
sodomy as "the conduct that defines the class" 40 of homosexuals.
Commentators have noted that the indeterminacy of the definition
of sodomy "allows those who oppose gay rights to equate homosexu-
ality with a vaguely repulsive act and to simultaneously remove het-
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. Compare, e.g., ARX CODE ANN. § 5-14-122 (Michie 1997) (applying only to
certain sexual acts with a person of the same sex or with an animal), with GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-6-2 (1996 & Supp. 1998) (including oral and anal sex without reference to
the gender of the parties), with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411 (West 1989) ('the
infamous crime against nature"), -1412 Cany lewd or lascivious act").
36. GA. CRIM. CODE § 26-5901 (1933), construed in Thompson v. Aldredge, 200
S.E. 799 (Ga. 1939) (holding that sodomy, as defined by Georgia state law, could
not be accomplished between two women). The law defined sodomy as "the carnal
knowledge and connection against the order of nature, by man with man, or in the
same unnatural manner with woman." GA. CRIM. CODE § 26-5901 (1933). The law
was amended in 1968. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 201 n.1 (1986)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referencing the change in Georgia's sodomy law).
37. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2, declared unconstitutional in Powell v. State, No.
$98A0755, 1998 WL 804568 (Ga. Nov. 23, 1998). The statute provided that:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he or she performs or
submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the
mouth or anus of another .... (b) A person convicted of the offense of sod-
omy shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more
than 20 years.
Id.
38. See Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act And Identity In And
After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REV. 1721, 1737 (1993). Evidence does not
support a correlation between sodomy and sexual orientation. One study found that
"eighty percent of married couples practiced oral and/or anal sex; that ninety-five
percent of American men had engaged in oral sex; and that homosexuals were no
more likely than heterosexuals to violate sodomy laws." Teresa M. Bruce, Doing The
Nasty: An Argument For Bringing Same-Sex Erotic Conduct Back Into The Court-
room, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1135, 1143 (1996) (citing PETER IRONS, THE COURAGE OF
THEIR CONVICTIONS 387 (1988)).
39. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1357 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting), vacated, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989).
40. Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
1999]
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erosexuals entirely from the definition of that act."41 This vagueness
of definition has become a source of "rhetorical and political power"
for anti-gay initiatives and decisions.42
Courts have relied on the legitimacy of states to proscribe
"homosexual sodomy," confirmed by the Supreme Court in Bowers v.
Hardwick,43 to rule against gay men and lesbians in non-sodomy
cases.44 "[S]odomy laws are given as the reason, for instance, for de-
priving lesbians and gay men of government jobs . . . and... are
used . .. against lesbian and gay litigants in nearly every possible
legal context."45 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that
since homosexuals are defined by the act of sodomy, and since the
government can outlaw sodomy, it follows that the government is
free to discriminate against homosexuals. 46
Equating sodomy with homosexuality has the effect of exoner-
ating heterosexuals, as evidenced in Bowers v. Hardwick,47 in which
Attorney General Michael Bowers defended Georgia's sodomy stat-
ute. The case was originally brought by two parties: Hardwick, who
had been arrested for oral sex with another man, and a heterosexual
couple. 48 The heterosexual couple's claim was dismissed for lack of
standing, 49 and the Supreme Court refused to rule on sodomy as it
41. Bruce, supra note 38, at 1150; see also Halley, supra note 38.
The duality of the sodomy statutes-sometimes an index of identity,
sometimes an index of acts--is a rhetorical mechanism in the subordina-
tion of homosexual identity and the superordination of heterosexual iden-
tity. Designating homosexual identity as the personal manifestation of
sodomy confirms its subordination. At the same time, the ways in which
homosexual identity is not sodomy are subject to an organized forgetting.
And heterosexual identity becomes superordinate not because it is abso-
lutely immune, but because it is intermittently and provisionally immune
from regulation under the sodomy statutes. This instability can be a
source of rhetorical and political power.
Halley, supra note 38, at 1722 (emphasis in original).
42. Halley, supra note 38, at 1722.
43. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
44. See Rubenstein, supra note 15, at 19 (finding that sodomy laws allow ho-
mosexuals to be branded as criminals).
45. Id. "Equating homosexuality with sodomy and sodomy with criminal ac-
tivity figures at the core of governmental discrimination against homosexuals.
Police justified their raids on gay bars in the 1950s and 1960s, for example, on the
ground that criminal activity might result from homosexual association." Bruce,
supra note 38, at 1149 (citation omitted).
46. See Padula, 822 F.2d at 97 (supporting the FBI's refusal to hire the plain-
tiff because he was homosexual).
47. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
48. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 188 n.2 (citing heterosexual couple John and Mary
Doe as original co-plaintiffs).
49. See id. (affirming the district court's dismissal on standing grounds). The
couple had not been arrested. See id.
[Vol. 17:57
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applied to both heterosexual and homosexual couples.50 The Court
explicitly stated that the ruling applied only to what it called
"homosexual sodomy,"5' even though the statute makes no such dis-
tinction.52 Once homosexual orientation has been reduced to the act
of sodomy and heterosexual acts have been removed from the defini-
tion of sodomy, discrimination against gay and lesbian citizens can
be easily justified.53
B. Anti-Discriminution Law
Currently, anti-discrimination law inadequately protects les-
bian and gay citizens from discrimination. Statutory prohibition of
discrimination based on sexual orientation exists only in limited
jurisdictions, and its status in some is tenuous. 54 Constitutional
jurisprudence may also fail to guarantee gay and lesbian citizens
the same fundamental rights and protections enjoyed by hetero-
sexuals.5 5 In this environment, concealing one's non-heterosexual
orientation becomes a prerequisite for retaining equal citizen-
ship.56 "[E]quahty for unpopular minorities can be secured only if
they are protected against retaliation for exercising their civil
rights by laws that prohibit discrimination against them in em-
50. See id.
51. Id.
52. See GA- CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1996 & Supp. 1998) (penalizing oral and anal
sex, without reference to the gender of either party), declared unconstitutional in
Powell v. State, No. S98A0755, 1998 WL 804568 (Ga. Nov. 23, 1998).
53. See infra Part IV.B.3.
54. Voters have tried to prevent or repeal anti-discrimination laws in several
jurisdictions, including Colorado, Cincinnati and Maine. See COLO. CONST. art. II,
§ 30b (held unconstitutional in Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)); Equality
Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir.
1995), vacated and remanded, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996); Carey Goldberg, Maine Voters
Repeal Gay Rights Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998, at Al.
55. See, e.g., Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985) (denying First Amendment protection to
Rowland's statement that she was bisexual, and denying equal protection because
the trial court did not identify whether Rowland was fired for her bisexuality or
because she talked about it); see also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 188 n.2
(1986) (refusing to rule on a sodomy statute that applied to persons of any sexual
orientation, and instead limiting its holding to "homosexual sodomy"); Singer v.
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974) (holding that denying same-sex couples the
right to marry did not violate equal protection); William Rubenstein, Don't Ask,
Don't Tell, 79 A.B.A. J. 55 (arguing that a policy that permits speech about sexual
orientation only if the speech reveals heterosexual, and not homosexual, orienta-
tion constitutes viewpoint censorship and is unconstitutional). But see Baehr v.
Miike, No. CIV 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996)
(holding the marriage statute, as construed, to deny marriage licenses to homo-
sexual couples unconstitutional on equal protection grounds).
56. See Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695
(1993) C[S]ilence and denial have been the linchpins of second-class status.").
1999]
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ployment, housing, education, and other critical areas of social and
economic activity."57
1. Statutory Law and Constitutional Amendments
Eleven states, 58 the District of Columbia59 and more than 200
municipalities 60 have enacted laws prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. Voter referenda have challenged
many of these statutes, sometimes leading to the repeal of the new
anti-discrimination laws. 61  Colorado is one example. 62  Several
cities, including Aspen,63 Boulder 64 and Denver,65 enacted anti-
discrimination statutes that protect sexual minorities from dis-
crimination in employment, housing, education and public accom-
modations. 66 By referendum, voters amended the state constitu-
tion to provide that neither the state nor any municipality shall
enact legislation entitling a person to claim protected status based
on homosexual orientation or conduct. 67 The amendment would
not only impact existing laws, but would also make any further
legislation possible only by first re-amending the constitution. 68 In
57. KAPLAN, supra note 13, at x.
58. Ten states currently have such laws in force: California (enacted in 1992),
CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1101, 1102, 1102(1) (West 1989 & Supp. 1999); Connecticut
(1991), CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-81a to -81r (West 1995); Hawaii (1991),
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 368-1, 378-2 (1993 & Supp. 1998); Massachusetts (1989),
MASS. ANN. LAwS, ch. 151B, § 3(6) (Lexis Supp. 1998); Minnesota (1993), MINN.
STAT. § 363.03 (1998); New Hampshire (1997), 1997 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-
A:1 to 17 (Lexis Supp. 1998); New Jersey (1992), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12 (West
1993); Rhode Island (1995), 1995 R.I. GEN. LAwS §§ 28-5-2 to 41 (1995 & Lexis
Supp. 1998); Vermont (1992), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1998); Wisconsin
(1982), WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31-32 (1997). Maine enacted an anti-discrimination
law in 1997, but it was repealed by a "people's veto" referendum Feb. 10, 1998. See
Carey Goldberg, Maine Voters Repeal Gay Rights Law, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1998,
at Al.
59. See D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 2512, 2515, 2519-20, 2533 (1992).
60. See American Civil Liberties Union Briefing Paper, No. 18 (last modified
Oct. 27, 1997) <http://www.aclu.org/library/pbpl8.html> [hereinafter ACLU
Briefing Paper].
61. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 58, at Al.
62. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-26 (1996) (holding Colorado Consti-
tutional Amendment, COLO. CONST. art. II § 30b, unconstitutional).
63. See ASPEN, COLO., MUN. CODE § 13-98 (1977).
64. See BOULDER, COLO., REV. CODE §§ 12-1-1 to -11 (1987).
65. See DENVER REV. MUN. CODE ch. 28, Art. IV §§ 28-91 to -116 (1991).
66. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 623-24 (1996).
67. See COLO. CONST. art. II § 30b.
68. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 624 ('[The amendment] prohibits all legislative,
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government designed to
protect... gays and lesbians.").
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Romer v. Evans,69 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down this
amendment in a rare rational basis defeat. Under a rational basis
analysis of equal protection, the government must show that the
law in question is rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose. 70 The amendment failed to meet the legitimacy require-
ment. The Court stated that equal protection means "at the very
least . . . that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular
group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest,"71 and
held that
Amendment 2 ... inflicts on [gays and lesbians] immediate,
continuing, and real injuries that outrun and belie any legiti-
mate justifications that may be claimed ....
We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals
not to further a proper legislative end but to make them une-
qual to everyone else. This Colorado cannot do. A State can-
not so deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws.
72
Currently, sexual minorities living in localities where state or
local anti-discrimination statutes have not been enacted have no
protection against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
Pending federal legislation would prohibit employment discrimina-
tion based on sexual orientation.73 The passage of the federal Em-
69. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
70. See id. at 631.
71. Id. at 634 (quoting Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)) (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court has held that private biases are
not a legitimate ground for governmental interests. See Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (1996);
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985); Palmore v. Sidoti,
466 U.S. 429 (1984); Department ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
72. Roner, 517 U.S. at 635 (1996). The state also asserted a claim that the
amendment protected First Amendment freedom of association interests of land-
lords, employers and others who have religious or personal objections to homo-
sexuality. See id. The Court, however, rejected the argument as being overbroad
and not rationally related to the freedom of association interest. See id.
73. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1997);
Employment Non-Discrimination Act, S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997). The Employ-
ment Non-Discrimination Act of 1996 was defeated by a 49-50 vote in the Senate.
142 CONG. REC. S10,139 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1996) (Rollcall Vote No. 281 Leg.). At a
recent hearing before the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, no wit-
nesses came forward to testify against the bill. See Winnie Stachelberg, Legisla-
tive Recap: Highlights of the First Half of the 1051h Congress, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN
Q., Winter 1998, at 14-15. "'My staff scoured the country for witnesses with dif-
fering opinions, to no avail .... Even those who had expressed a desire to testify
[against it] changed their minds."' Id. at 15 (quoting Senator Jeffords, Chair of the
Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee); see also The Employment Non-
discrimination Act of 1997: Hearings on S. 869 Before the Senate Labor and Hu-
man Resources Committee., 105th Cong., 1997 WL 664848 (statement of Christo-
pher E. Anders); WL 667695 (statement of Oliver Thomas); WL 667710 (statement
of James Jeffords); WL 667731 (statement of Raymond W. Smith); WL 667735
(statement of Elizabeth Birch); WL 673750 (statement of David N. Horowitz); WL
753310 (statement of Chai R. Feldblim) (F.D.C.H.) (testifying in support of the
1999]
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ployment Non-Discrimination Act74 would provide legal protection
against employment discrimination for persons of any sexual ori-
entation.75
2. Constitutional Issues
When discrimination results from governmental action, gay
men and lesbians may bring constitutional claims, including rights
to intimate and expressive association,76 free speech and equal
protection.
a. First Amendment Guarantees: Freedom of Intimate and
Expressive Association
Rights to intimate and expressive association are derived
from the First Amendment free speech and free assembly provi-
sions.7 7 Courts employ strict scrutiny when considering First
Amendment claims: the government action at issue must be nar-
rowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.78
When the government acts as employer, rather than as sovereign,
the court uses a less stringent standard that balances the plain-
tiffs constitutional interest against the governmental interest as
an employer. 79 A public employer is justly concerned with the ef-
fective and efficient functioning of the government, and "review of
every personnel decision made by a public employer could... ham-
per the performance of public functions. 80  However, the govern-
ment's interest as an employer does not "differ significantly" from its
bill).
74. H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997).
75. See Employment Non-Discrimination Act, H.R. 1858, 105th Cong. (1997);
S. 869, 105th Cong. (1997). Additionally, protection may be available for federal
employees. President Clinton issued an Executive Order on May 13, 1998, pro-
hibiting discrimination in federal employment based on sexual orientation. Exec.
Order No. 13,087, 63 Fed. Reg. 30,097 (1998).
76. See infra note 175.
77. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 228 (Leonard W. Levy et
al. eds., Supp. I 1992).
78. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that when a gov-
ernment regulation burdens free exercise of religion, the government regulation
must pursue a particularly important governmental goal, and an exemption from
the regulation would substantially hinder the fulfillment of that goal); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (applying strict scrutiny in assessing associational
rights of NAACP members). But see Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872
(1990) (limiting the exemption rule to unemployment compensation cases).
79. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 116 S. Ct. 2342, 2349 (1996);
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,
568 (1968) (applying a balancing test to burdens on First Amendment rights when
the government acted as employer).
80. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987).
[Vol. 17:57
SHAHAR V. BOWERS
interest in regulating the citizenry in general.8 1 Public employees
may not be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights they
normally enjoy as citizens.82
The right to intimate and expressive83 association calls forth
values of self-identity, personal choice and expression. 84 Constitu-
tional protection guarantees the right to express one's thoughts
and opinions through speech, one's religious beliefs through relig-
ious practice, and one's sense of intimacy and belonging through
intimate relationships. 85
Identifying oneself as gay or lesbian is an expression of one's
identity. 86 As Justice William Brennan noted with respect to a pub-
lic employee who was fired after confiding in a co-worker that she
was bisexual, "it is realistically impossible to separate [one's] spoken
statements from [one's] status."87 Penalizing an employee for com-
ing-out speech "would make the promise of equality a sham for les-
bian and gay citizens, comparable to denying religion-based protec-
tion to Jews who wear yarmulkes or Christians who wear crosses."
88
The choice of one's intimate partner and the choice to marry
are also expressions of identity.89 Freedom of intimate association
protects "certain kinds of highly personal relationships" such as
marriage and family. 90 The denial of marriage for same-sex cou-
ples "limit[s] homosexuals' opportunities for expressive self-
identification."91 "Protecting these relationships from unwarranted
state interference ... safeguards the ability independently to define
one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty."92
81. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
82. See, e.g., id. (stating that teachers may not be constitutionally compelled to
relinquish First Amendment rights to comment on matters of public interest asso-
ciated with the operation of the public schools in which they work).
83. Freedom of expressive association protects "the right to associate with oth-
ers in pursuit of a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious,
and cultural ends." Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984).
84. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 783-84 (Leonard W.
Levy et al. eds., 1985).
85. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-22.
86. See infra Part II.B.2.c.
87. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 470 U.S. 1009, 1016 n.l (1985)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
88. Hunter, supra note 56, at 1718.
89. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 84, at 784.
"[M]arriage itself takes on special significance for its expressive content as a
statement that the couple wish to identify with each other." Id.
90. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
91. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 84, at 788.




A governmental action will be upheld under equal protection
review if it is rationally related to a legitimate governmental in-
terest.93 The scrutiny is heightened if there is a suspect classifica-
tion, such as race, national origin94 or gender.95 Federal courts
have not applied heightened scrutiny to classifications based on
sexual orientation. 96 However, a classification that distinguishes
between same-sex and opposite-sex couples may be regarded as a
gender classification. 97 The Hawaii Supreme Court held, in Baehr
v. Lewin, that denying marriage to same-sex couples constituted
sex-based classification, invoking strict scrutiny.98
93. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976)
(applying rational basis in absence of any suspect classification).
94. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (employing strict scru-
tiny to assess discrimination based on race).
95. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (suggesting intermediate
scrutiny for gender discrimination).
96. In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court did not reach the question of
whether to apply heightened scrutiny; government action failed a rational basis
inquiry. 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); see also Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati,
Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 266-67 (6th Cir. 1995), vacated and re-
manded, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996).
Since Bowers, every circuit court which has addressed the issue has de-
creed that homosexuals are entitled to no special constitutional protec-
tion, as either a suspect or a quasi-suspect class, because the conduct
which places them in that class is not constitutionally protected....
Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 684 n. 3 (D.C. Cir.1994) (en banc) (following
Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir.1987) (It would be quite
anomalous, on its face, to declare status defined by conduct that states may
constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal
protection clause")); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004, 110 S. Ct. 1296, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990) ('If ho-
mosexual conduct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals
do not constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than ra-
tional basis scrutiny for equal protection purposes"); High Tech Gays v. De-
fense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir.1990)
(same); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.Cir.1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1003, 110 S. Ct. 1295, 108 L.Ed.2d 473 (1990)
(homosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature and as such is not immuta-
ble; "[a]fter Hardwick it cannot logically be asserted that discrimination
against homosexuals is constitutionally infirm").
Accord, Baker v. Wade, 769 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir.1985) (en banc), cert.
denied, 478 U.S. 1022, 106 S. Ct. 3337, 92 L.Ed.2d 742 (1986)
(homosexuals compose neither a suspect nor a quasi-suspect class); Na-
tional Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City, 729 F.2d
1270, 1273 (10th Cir.1984), affd mer. by an equally divided Court, 470
U.S. 903, 105 S. Ct. 1858, 84 L.Ed.2d 776 (1985) (legal classification of
gays is not suspect) (both decided prior to Bowers).
Id. at 266-67, 266 n.2.
97. See Baehr v. Lewin, 854 P.2d 44, 64 (1993).
98. Id. at 68; see also Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI,
1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Feb. 27, 1998). In Brause, involving a male couple
denied a marriage license, the "choice of a life partner" was held to be a fundamen-
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The equal protection provision limits governmental authority
to make classifications and guarantees that people who are simi-
larly situated will be treated alike.99 A gay man or a lesbian who
is treated differently than a heterosexual person presents a valid
claim that a classification was drawn: the classification of
"homosexuals."100 Classifications that fall under equal protection
scrutiny are generally based on a person's "status" as defined by
belonging to a particular race, nationality or gender.10' The classi-
fications "heterosexuals" and "homosexuals" are similarly status-
based classifications. Yet some courts have denied equal protec-
tion review on the theory that the governmental regulation did not
draw a status-based classification of "homosexuals."10 2 Rather, the
regulation merely sought to regulate "homosexual conduct." 103
c. The Status - Conduct Dichotomy
This status-conduct dichotomy underlies the befuddlement in
constitutional jurisprudence concerning sexual orientation. 0 4
Disagreement surrounds what constitutes "conduct," particularly in
the area of coming-out speech.' 05 The California Supreme Court
recognized speech that identifies one's sexual orientation as political
speech. 0 6 But other courts view coming-out speech as conduct,
and have denied both equal protection review and First Amend-
tal right. See id. at *1. The court found it unnecessary to reach the issue of sex-
based classification, but commented, "Sex-based classification can hardly be more
obvious." Id. at *5.
99. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1438 (2d ed. 1988).
100. See infra Part IV.C.
101. See supra notes 93-98 (giving examples of cases in which courts have ap-
plied various levels of scrutiny).
102. See Shahar v. Bowers, 836 F. Supp. 859, 867-68 (N.D. Ga. 1993)
(dismissing plaintiffs equal protection claim because the "'classification'-if any-
is not based on mere sexual orientation, but on sexual orientation plus conduct"),
affd, 114 F.3d 1097 (l1th Cir. 1997) (affirming that plaintiff failed to present an
equal protection claim because the record did not support an inference that defen-
dant revoked her job offer "because of her sexual orientation-as opposed to her
conduct in 'marrying' another woman"). Other courts have granted equal protec-
tion review but denied heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d
97 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ('We therefore think the courts' reasoning in Hardwick ...
forecloses appellant's efforts to gain suspect class status for practicing homosexu-
als. It would be quite anomalous, on its face, to declare status defined by conduct
that states may constitutionally criminalize as deserving of strict scrutiny under
the equal protection clause.").
103. See supra note 102.
104. See infra Part IV.C.
105. See id. Speech that identifies oneself as gay or lesbian is commonly re-
ferred to as "coming-out" speech.





Under the United States military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy,108 to admit that one is lesbian or gay is to cross a line from
purportedly permissible "orientation" to impermissible
"conduct."'1 9 The policy states that sexual orientation will not be a
bar to service unless manifested by homosexual conduct.110 Conduct
is then defined to include "statements by a member that he or she is
homosexual or bisexual, or homosexual marriage [sic].""' Not only
are the words "I am gay," spoken by a service member, considered
evidence of "homosexual conduct," but speaking the words is in it-
self impermissible conduct. The military treats coming-out speech
as conduct, thereby "utilizing the speech/conduct distinction as a sub
rosa tool for legitimating the . . . discriminatory policy."112  This
"evidentiary sleight-of-hand""i 3 allows the government to escape
scrutiny of a classification based on sexual orientation and to down-
play the infringement upon free speech.
Another evidentiary sleight of hand is the conflation of homo-
sexuality and sodomy, which employs status (homosexuality) to im-
plicate certain criminal conduct (sodomy). By using a person's ho-
mosexuality as evidence of criminal conduct, the court can couch its
reasoning in the rhetoric of impermissible conduct, even though the
"conduct" was merely assumed from the orientation. 114
Taken together, classifying speech as conduct, and conflating
homosexuality and sodomy, produces a twisted chain of logic.
When a gay or lesbian person speaks of his or her sexual orienta-
107. The Seventh Circuit denied First Amendment protection on the theory that
coming-out speech is an indication of probable conduct. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,
881 F.2d 454, 458-62 (7th Cir. 1989) ('We are here concerned with plaintiffs forth-
right admission that she is a homosexual. That reasonably implies, at the very
least, a 'desire' to commit homosexual acts."). The court granted equal protection
analysis, but denied heightened scrutiny based on Hardwick. "If homosexual con-
duct may constitutionally be criminalized, then homosexuals do not constitute a
suspect or quasi-suspect class entitled to greater than rational basis scrutiny for
equal protection purposes. The Constitution, in light of Hardwick, cannot other-
wise be rationally applied, lest an unjustified and indefensible inconsistency re-
sult." Id. at 464-65 (footnote omitted).
108. 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)-(3) (1993).
109. See Bruce, supra note 38, at 1158-59.
110. See Summary Report of the Military Working Group, Office of the Secretary
of Defense, July 1, 1993, at 13.
111. Id. at 4; see also 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(1)-(3) (providing that a service member
will be separated from the armed forces for homosexual acts or attempted acts, mar-
riage or attempted marriage to a person of the same sex, or statements by the service
member that he or she is a homosexual or bisexual).
112. Bruce, supra note 38, at 1159.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1140.
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tion, the court assumes that he or she must engage in sodomy or
some other impermissible "homosexual conduct." The court then
relies on that "conduct" to dismiss both equal protection and First
Amendment claims. An equal protection claim is disallowed be-
cause the regulation is said to target not homosexuals as a class,
but "homosexual behavior." The focus on behavior also obscures
the fact that coming-out speech is indeed speech, and in this way
the court denies First Amendment protection of free speech. 115 By
treating speech as conduct, and assuming conduct from sexual ori-
entation, gay and lesbian citizens are denied constitutional guar-
antees of equal protection and freedom of speech. 116
This conflation of conduct with speech and orientation muddles
judicial and legislative decisions affecting sexual minorities."17
The failure to clarify these issues produces arbitrary distinctions,
legitimizes governmental regulation based on sexual orientation
and allows prohibitions against "impermissible conduct" to trump
the constitutional protection guaranteed to speech, expression and
association.
C. Marriage
A political battle over same-sex marriage has been waged
across the nation since the Hawaii courts upheld marriage rights
for same-sex couples in Baehr v. Miike.118 In Baehr, and more re-
cently in Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics,"9 same-sex couples
challenged the constitutionality of state marriage statutes after
being denied marriage licenses. 20 Both the Hawaii Supreme
Court and the Superior Court of Alaska required the state to dem-
onstrate the marriage statute was justified by a compelling state
interest and was narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary infringe-
ment upon constitutional rights. 12' Both courts found the statutes
employed a sex-based classification.122 On remand, the Baehr cir-
cuit court held the state failed to meet its evidentiary burden of
proving that the statute furthered a compelling state interest 123 and
115. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 444 (6th Cir. 1984).
116. See id.
117. See Hunter, supra note 56, at 1717.
118. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), affd sub non. Baehr v. Miike,
No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1993).
119. No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Feb. 27, 1998).
120. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 48-49; Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *1.
121. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68; Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *6.
122. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 64; Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *6.
123. See Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, at *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
The court further noted that "assuming arguendo that Defendant was able to dem-
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held the statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds. 124
While Baehr found no fundamental right to same-sex mar-
riages, 125 Brause held the right to choose one's partner is constitu-
tionally protected. 126 Baehr's analysis focused on the link between
marriage and the rights surrounding procreation, and concluded
that "a right to same-sex marriage is [not] so rooted in the tradi-
tions and collective conscience of our people that failure to recog-
nize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and jus-
tice that lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions."'127
The Brause analysis posed a different question. 128 "The relevant
question is not whether same-sex marriage is so rooted in our tra-
ditions that it is a fundamental right, but whether the freedom to
choose one's own life partner is so rooted in our traditions."'129
Brause concluded that "just as the 'decision to marry and raise a
child in a traditional family setting' is constitutionally protected as
a fundamental right, so too should the decision to choose one's life
partner and have a recognized nontraditional family be constitu-
tionally protected. It is the decision itself that is fundamental."'' 30
Public and legislative response to these cases has been dra-
matic. Voters in both Hawaii and Alaska approved state constitu-
tional amendments to quash the possibility of legal marriage for
same-sex couples,' 3 ' and state legislatures across the country have
enacted statutes to do the same. 132 Twenty-six states have enacted
statutes prohibiting same-sex marriage since the Baehr decision, 133
onstrate that the sex-based classification of HRS § 572-1 is justified because it fur-
thers a compelling state interest, Defendant has failed to establish that HRS § 572-1
is narrowly tailored to avoid unnecessary abridgments of constitutional rights." Id.
124. See id. at *22.
125. See Baehr, 852 P.2d at 55-57.
126. See Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *4-6.
127. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 56-57.
128. See Brause, 1998 WL 88743, at *4.
129. Id.
130. Id. at *6 (citation omitted).
131. Alaska voters, by a 68-32 margin, approved a constitutional amendment
that defines marriage as a union between one man and one woman, and Hawaii
voters authorized their state legislature "to reserve marriage to opposite-sex cou-
ples." Lyle Denniston, Voters in Alaska, Hawaii Defeat Initiatives on Homosexual
Marriage, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 5, 1998, at A15; see also H.B. No. 117, 19th Leg.
(Haw. 1997); Joint Res. 42, 20th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1997).
132. See Evan Wolfson, Freedom To Marry Organization, Anti-Marriage Bills
1997-State-by-State Report (last modified Sept. 25, 1997)
<http://www.ftm.org/overview/state-by-state.html>.
133. Twenty-nine states currently ban same-sex marriages. Twenty-six of these
states have banned same-sex marriages since 1995: Alabama, Executive Order of
the Governor, (visited Oct. 13, 1998) <http://www.ngltf.org/97cga~lmarriage.gif>;
Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Lexis 1998); Arizona, ARIZONA REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-101(c) (West Supp. 1998); Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (Michie
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and bills are pending in several more.134
Federal legislation has been enacted to ensure the accommoda-
tion of states' same-sex marriage prohibitions. 135 In 1996, Congress
passed the Defense of Marriage Act, 136 an anti-gay initiative that
relieved states of the responsibility of recognizing same-sex mar-
riages performed in other states. The Act also established that the
federal government will not recognize same-sex marriages, thus de-
nying federal benefits to a same-sex spouse that would be available
to an opposite-sex spouse. 137
Despite prohibitive legislation, gay and lesbian couples con-
tinue to marry. 38 The significance of marriage in our society can
hardly be overstated. Marriage carries with it considerable recogni-
tion in social, religious, economic and political spheres of life.
139
People marry for many reasons: to enter into a committed relation-
ship with one another, to signify to family, friends and acquain-
tances the nature of the relationship, to follow the teachings of one's
religion, to provide for one's spouse financially, and to care for and
make decisions on behalf of one another.14'
Some gay and lesbian couples attempt to marry legally and
1998); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212 (West Supp. 1999); Georgia, GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (Michie Supp. 1998); Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1996); Illinois,
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212 (West Supp. 1998); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 31-
11-1-1 (Michie 1997); Kentucky, H.B. No. 13, 1998 Reg. Sess. (Ky. 1998) (enacted
April 2, 1998); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701 (West 1998); Michigan,
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 551.1, .271-72 (West Supp. 1998); Minnesota, MINN.
STAT. § 517.03 (1998); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (West Supp. 1998);
Missouri, MO. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (West 1997); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. §
40-1-401 (1997); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (1997); North Dakota,
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01, -08 (1997); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit.43, § 3.1 (West
1999); Pennsylvania, 23 PA_ CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West Supp. 1998); South
Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law. Co-op. 1996); South Dakota, S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie Supp. 1998); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-
113 (1996); Texas, TEXAS FAMILY CODE ANN. § 2.001 (West 1998); Virginia, VA.
CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 1995 & Supp. 1998); Washington, Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 26.04.020(1)(c) (West Supp. 1999). Three other states had same-sex mar-
riage prohibitions prior to 1995: Louisiana (1988), LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 86, 89
(West 1993); Kansas (1995), KAN. STAT, ANN. § 23-101 (1995 & Supp. 1997); Utah
(1993), UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1998).
134. See, e.g., H. Res. 382, 77th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (Iowa 1997) (enacted Apr. 15,
1998); S. Res. 287, 77th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (Iowa 1997) (introduced Feb. 11, 1998)
(limiting valid marriages to one man and one woman).
135. See Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996); 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
137. According to federal law, "the word 'marriage' means only a legal union be-
tween one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers
only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife." 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
138. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F. 3d 1097, 1100 (stating that Shahar and
her partner were married by their rabbi).
139. See KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 209-11.
140. See id.
Law and Inequality
challenge state laws after being denied marriage licenses. 141 Other
couples participate in commitment ceremonies, often performed
within their religious communities,142 without claiming civil or legal
recognition of their marriages. 143
Many rights and benefits are accorded on the basis of marital
status.144 A report by the United States General Accounting Office,
completed in response to the Defense of Marriage Act, identified
1049 federal laws in which marital status is a factor, including the
allocation of Social Security benefits, food stamps and Veterans
benefits.145 Spouses enjoy property and inheritance rights, tax bene-
fits and government employee benefits that non-spouses are de-
nied. 146 These and myriad other rights and benefits 147 are allocated
141. See, e.g., Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, 1998
WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Feb. 27, 1998) (holding that marriage is a fundamental
right, and requiring the state to demonstrate a compelling interest to support the
refusal to recognize this fundamental right by those who choose same-sex part-
ners); Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 580 (1993) (explaining how plaintiffs filed ap-
plications for marriage licenses but were denied solely on the ground that the ap-
plicants were of the same sex, and requiring strict scrutiny on remand).
142. See supra note 138.
143. See, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F. 3d at 1100, 1106-07 (11th Cir. 1997)
(discussing Shahar's claim of no civil or legal recognition of her marriage).
144. See GAO/OGC-97-16 Defense of Marriage Act; see also William B. Ruben-
stein, Non-Marital Forms Of Recognition, in LEGAL ISSUES FACING THE NON-
TRADITIONAL FAMILY 111-12 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1994); Freedom To Marry
Organization, Rights & Benefits of Marriage (visited Mar. 17, 1998)
<http://www.ftm.org/overview/benefits.html> (providing examples of benefits af-
forded married persons, such as child custody, death benefits, income tax deduc-
tions and real property exemptions).
145. See GAO/OGC-97-16 Defense of Marriage Act.
146. See id.
147. See Rubenstein, Non-Marital Forms Of Recognition, supra note 144, at
111-12.
These benefits include rights to spousal shares of marital property upon
death of one partner, tax benefits (including joint income tax returns, de-
pendency deductions, gift tax exemptions, and exemptions for alimony and
property settlements); rights in tort law (including emotional distress,
wrongful death actions, and loss of consortium); rights in criminal law
(including immunity from compelled testimony and the marital communi-
cation privilege); non-exclusion under zoning laws; visitation privileges in
hospitals and other institutions; authority to make decisions for an ill
spouse; employee benefits for spouses (including health insurance, medi-
cal leave, and bereavement leave); government benefits (including Social
Security and veterans payments to spouses, workers compensation for
those whose spouses move for job-related reasons); lower fees for married
couples (including automobile and life insurance, family travel rates, and
family memberships); immigration benefits; and draft exemptions.
Id," see also Freedom To Marry Organization, Rights & Benefits of Marriage (visited
Mar. 17, 1998) <http://www.ftm.org/overviewlbenefits.html> ("Mlarriage is a pow-
erful legal and social idea that protects and supports intimate family relationships
by providing a unique set of rights, privileges, and benefits. Those who can marry
often take these rights for granted, but for gay men and lesbians, these benefits
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to couples in heterosexual marriages and denied to couples in gay
marriages. 148 As the Hawaii Supreme Court noted in Baehr,
"marriage is a state-conferred legal status, the existence of which
gives rise to rights and benefits reserved exclusively to that par-
ticular relationship." 149 The state has conferred legal status and its
corresponding rights and benefits only to heterosexual couples. 150
In summary, the status of the law regarding sexual minori-
ties is ambiguous. While anti-discrimination measures promise
equality, marriage statutes deny equal treatment to same-sex cou-
ples, and criminal statutes proscribe sexual intimacy for gay and
lesbian couples. 51 "In this state [of virtual equality], gay and les-
bian people possess some of the trappings of full equality but are de-
nied all of its benefits."' 52
III. Shahar v. Bowers
The Shahar v. Bowers153 court applied a balancing test,
rather than a strict scrutiny standard, to weigh Shahar's constitu-
tional interests against the Attorney General's interests as an em-
ployer. 154 Relying on Pickering v. Board of Education, 55 the court
distinguished the role of government as an employer from gov-
ernment as a sovereign and afforded the government employer a
higher degree of deference. 56 The court did not consider the ques-
tion of whether Shahar enjoys the right to intimate association
are forever denied."). Gay couples also lack rights in family law, inheritance and
disclosure law. See id.
148. See Rubenstein, Non-Marital Forms Of Recognition, supra note 144, at
111-12.
149. Baehr v. Lewin, 74 Haw. 530, 533 (1993).
150. See Rubenstein, Non-Marital Forns Of Recognition, supra note 144, at
111-12 (describing the difficulties gay couples experience in gaining legal recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages).
151. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363.03 (1997) (prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation); MINN. STAT. § 517.03 (1997) (prohibiting same-sex marriage);
MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1987) (prohibiting sodomy); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-3501, -
3505 (1988) (prohibiting same-sex sodomy).
152. URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY: THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND
LESBIAN LIBERATION 4 (1995).
153. Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
693 (1998).
154. The district court applied the Pickering balancing test. See Shahar v. Bow-
ers, 836 F. Supp. 859, 864 (N.D. Ga. 1993). The l1th Circuit panel remanded the
case with instructions to apply strict scrutiny. See Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d
1218, 1225 (11th Cir. 1995), vacated, 78 F.3d 499, 500 (11th Cir. 1996). The en
banc court reestablished Pickering as the appropriate standard of review. See
Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1103-11.
155. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
156. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1102-03 (explaining why the Pickering balance test
is the appropriate test for evaluating a government employer's decision).
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and expressive association regarding her relationship with her
partner, but rather assumed arguendo that such rights exist.'
57
The court then weighed the interests of the Attorney General
against the plaintiffs assumed constitutional rights.
158
The court considered that a staff attorney in the Office of the
Attorney General is in a "special class" of employment: the attor-
ney is involved in policy making, has access to high level confi-
dences, and acts as a spokesperson for the Department. 159 The po-
sition demands that the attorney exercise good judgment and
discretion, and maintain her employer's trust. 60 The court further
distinguished the position as being one of "personal staff' of the
Attorney General and noted that Eleventh Circuit precedent held
such personal staff were not protected under certain anti-
discrimination statutes.'16
The court considered the interests of the Attorney General
and concluded that it was not unreasonable for him to lose confi-
dence in Shahar. Stating that Attorney General Bowers "may
properly limit the lawyers on his professional staff to persons in
whom he has trust,"'162 the court accepted Shahar's same-sex
"marriage" and "wedding" as evidence she lacked good sense. 163
Her willingness to discuss her homosexual relationship demon-
strated her lack of discretion. 164 The court held the Attorney Gen-
eral could reasonably conclude Shahar may interfere with the De-
partment's ability to handle controversial matters such as gay
marriage licenses, gay parents' rights, employment benefits or in-
surance coverage for domestic partners, or law enforcement relat-
ing to homosexual sodomy. 165 The Attorney General, having rea-
sonably lost confidence in Shahar, "made a personnel decision
which none of the asserted federal constitutional provisions pro-
hibited him from making."166
The court also determined that the Attorney General was not
157. See id. at 1099-1100. The court expressed grave doubt about the existence
of such rights, but exercised judicial restraint to avoid reaching constitutional
questions where unnecessary. See id. The court stated that "even a favorable de-
cision on these constitutional questions would entitle Plaintiff to no relief in this
case." Id.
158. See id. at 1103-11.
159. Id. at 1103-04.
160. See id.
161. Id. at 1104 n.15.
162. Id. at 1104.
163. Id. at 1104-06.
164. See id. at 1103-06.
165. See id. at 1105.
166. Id. at 1110-11.
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unreasonable to believe that Shahar's presence on his staff could
damage the Department's credibility with the public.167
"[R]easonable persons may suspect that having a Staff Attorney
who is part of a same-sex 'marriage' is the same thing as having a
Staff Attorney who violates the State's law against homosexual
sodomy."'168 The court granted the Attorney General a "wide de-
gree of deference" when an employee has a "special personal inter-
est" that may interfere with a state interest, such as prosecuting
sodomy cases. 169 While Shahar was to work in an area which
posed no apparent conflict with her personal interests, 170 the court
did not require a particularized showing of the potential interfer-
ence and refused to impose "limited utility" of a staff member who
could work on certain types of cases but not on others.171
The court concluded that the Attorney General acted rea-
sonably, considering the Department's concerns for credibility and
public perception, the ability to handle controversial matters and
the working relationships of people within the Department. 172 The
special nature of the employment requires that a Staff Attorney
exercise good judgment and discretion, and maintain the trust of
her employer. 173 In summary, the court found that none of the as-
serted constitutional measures prohibit the Attorney General from
withdrawing Shahar's employment offer. 174
IV. Discussion
The Shahar v. Bowers court's analysis centered on the issue
of reasonableness, 175 determining whether it was reasonable for
167. See id. at 1103-06.
168. Id. at 1105 n.17.
169. Id. at 1107-08.
170. Shahar would have handled mostly death penalty appeals. See id. at 1108.
171. See id.
172. See id. at 1110.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. Four separate dissents criticized the Shahar ruling on several different
grounds, only some of which are discussed in this Article. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at
1118-22 (Godbold, J., dissenting); id. at 1122-25 (Kravitch, J., dissenting); id. at
1125-29 (Birch, J., dissenting); id. at 1129-34 (Barkett, J., dissenting). The dis-
senters challenged the reasonableness of the Attorney General's decision. Judge
Godbold concluded that the Attorney General acted unreasonably because he
never discussed the situation with Shahar. See id. at 1121 (Godbold, J., dissent-
ing). By failing to conduct a reasonable investigation, his decision was based on
his own erroneous assumptions. See id. at 1120-22 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
Judge Kravitch noted that to the extent the Attorney General considered Shahar's
acts political, and thus disruptive to the office, he did not act reasonably. See id. at
1124 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
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the Attorney General to think that the public and Department
personnel might react negatively to Shahar's employment. 76 But
the court failed to thoroughly examine whether Bowers' concerns
about public reaction constituted a legitimate interest 17 7 and
Another ground for dissent was the court's avoidance of the question whether
Shahar enjoyed constitutionally protected rights of intimate and expressive asso-
ciation. See id. at 1099-1100, 1102; supra Part II.B.2.a. While the court expressed
"considerable doubt" that Shahar's relationship deserved such protection, the court
assumed "for the sake of argument only" that these rights exist. Shahar, 114 F.3d
at 1099-1100. In his concurring opinion, Judge Tjoflat criticized the court for side-
stepping the constitutional question and argued simply that homosexual relation-
ships are not protected under the First Amendment right to intimate association.
See id. at 1111-15 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). To find constitutional protection for
intimate association between homosexuals, Tjoflat would first require a finding
that "homosexual relationships have 'played a critical role in the culture and tradi-
tions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting shared ideals and beliefs."' Id.
at 1114 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). Tjoflat asserted that gay and lesbian relation-
ships have played no such role. See id. at 1113-15 (Toflat, J., concurring). In-
stead, Tjoflat implied that lesbian and gay relationships more closely resemble
brief hotel room encounters than family relationships. See id. at 1113-15 (Toflat,
J., concurring) (relying on FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990), in
which associations formed in a hotel room rented for only a few hours did not con-
stitute relationships that have "played a critical role in the culture and traditions of
the Nation") (citation omitted). While Hardwick found no connection between sod-
omy and family relationships, Tjoflat would find no connection between relation-
ships of gay and lesbian couples and family relationships. See id. at 1113-15
(Tjoflat, J., concurring).
The Tjoflat concurrence and majority opinion dicta present troubling assump-
tions and implications. First, Tjoflat would establish an additional burden of proof
on the plaintiff: a prerequisite showing that gay and lesbian relationships have
substantially contributed to society. While this issue was not determinative in this
case, these judicial arguments are nonetheless disturbing because there are no
such burdens placed on heterosexuals. Equally disturbing is the conflation of sex-
ual orientation and sodomy, and the presumption that if there is no right to en-
gage in homosexual sodomy, there is no right to enjoy gay and lesbian relation-
ships. See supra Part II.A. This obsession with sodomy runs throughout the
majority opinion and was highly influential in, if not ultimately determinative of,
the outcome. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101, 1104-05, 1105 n.17, 1108, 1110, 1110
n.25. While the court did not plainly reject the existence of a protected intimate
relationship, the court afforded it very little weight.
Finally, the dissenting opinions criticized the court's failure to weigh Shahar's
interests in the balance. See id. at 1124-25 (Kravitch, J., dissenting); id. at 1129-
30, 1134 (Barkett, J., dissenting). While the court professed to employ a balancing
test, it admittedly failed to determine what weight to assign Shahar's interests.
See id. at 1106. Judge Barkett referred to the court's "wholesale restructuring of
Pickering," and argued that the Attorney General had "an evidentiary burden to offer
credible predictions of harm or disruption based on more than mere speculation." Id.
at 1129, 1133-34.
Likewise, Judge Kravitch asserted that the court "employed a balancing test
in name only," id. at 1124, and "inappropriately grant[ed] virtually absolute defer-
ence to Bowers, without weighing the countervailing interests on which he im-
pinge[d]. Such an approach categorically exempts Bowers' employment decisions
from scrutiny ...." Id. at 1124 n.4.
176. See id. at 1109-10.
177. See id. at 1108. The court dismissed cases in which public perception was
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whether his inferences were permissible. 7 8 Once the illegitimate
interests and impermissible assumptions are removed, little re-
mains on the Attorney General's scale to weigh against Shahar's
constitutionally protected rights. The decision ultimately fails on
grounds of illegitimate interests and impermissible inferences.
A. Illegitimate Governmental Interests
While the court's examination of the Attorney General's rea-
sonableness was cursory at best, the court completely failed to ex-
amine the legitimacy of the governmental interest. 179 As Judge
Birch stated, "[The key question is not whether the government of-
ficial reasonably could assume that the public might have a negative
reaction to the employee's presence; it is whether the public's percep-
tion . . . is itself a legitimate basis for government action."180 The
Supreme Court has held that private biases are not legitimate
grounds for governmental interests.' 8'
The Shahar court never specifically addressed the legitimacy of
the governmental interests. 8 2 Judge Birch argued in dissent,
held to constitute an illegitimate basis for governmental action. See id. at 1105 n.17,
1110 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), which held that prohibition of in-
terracial marriages is unconstitutional, and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635
(1996), which struck down an amendment to a state constitution because it im-
permissibly disadvantaged a particular class of people). But see Shahar, 114 F.3d
at 1108-09 (relying on public perception concerns in McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d
936 (l1th Cir. 1985)).
178. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101, 1105-06, 1108, 1110 (accepting inferences
that Shahar lacked discretion and good judgment, that Shahar's special personal
interests would interfere with the efficient workings of the office, and that the
public and Department employees would assume that Shahar violated Georgia's
sodomy law); id. at 1126-27 (Birch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the inferences and
assumptions do not constitute a legitimate state interest).
179. See id. at 1126-27 (Birch, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1128 (Birch, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
181. See Romer 517 U.S. at 635 (holding that the amendment to the Constitu-
tion of Colorado is unconstitutional since it classifies homosexuals not to further a
proper legislative end, but to make them unequal to everyone else); City of Cle-
burne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (requiring a permit for a group
home for the mentally retarded rests on an irrational prejudice and is therefore
invalid); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (holding racial prejudice cannot
justify racial classifications); Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973) (holding that "a purpose to discriminate against hippies" cannot justify the
"unrelated person" provision).
182. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1105 n.17 (dismissing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967), in which the Court held that public perception of miscegenation was not a le-
gitimate governmental interest); id. at 1110 (dismissing Romer, in which the Court
held that public hostility toward homosexuals was not a legitimate governmental
interest); id. at 1126-27 (Birch, J., dissenting). But see id. at 1108-09 (relying on
McMullen v. Carson, 754 F.2d 936, 940 (11th Cir. 1985), in which the court considered
public perception determinative in ruling that a sheriffs interest outweighed the
First Amendment interest of an employee who was a recruiter for the Ku Klux lan).
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If the public's perception is borne of no more than unsup-
ported assumptions and stereotypes, it is irrational and can-
not serve as the basis of legitimate government action. In this
instance, the public's (alleged) blanket assumption that "if it's
homosexual, it would have to be sodomy" is based not on any-
thing set forth in the record but rather on public stereotyping
and animosity toward homosexuals. 183
The Attorney General has a legitimate interest in the effi-
cient workings of his office and in the credibility of the Depart-
ment. What is not legitimate is his reliance on public stereotypes
and erroneous assumptions about lesbians and gay men. 8 4 "Under
the principles articulated in Romer, this does not provide the state
with a legitimate, rational basis to discriminate against Shahar.
Bowers' 'concern' for the public's perception of homosexuals, there-
fore, is entitled to no weight in balancing Shahar's right of intimate
association."18 5
B. Impermissible Inferences
Shahar wrongly allowed inferences favorable to the Attorney
General 186 and did not allow inferences in Shahar's favor. 8 7 In a
summary judgment proceeding, the court must determine "whether
a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evi-
dence presented."'8 8 If a jury could possibly find the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision unreasonable, the court must deny his request for
summary judgment. 8 9 The court must construe inferences in light
most favorable to Shahar, the nonmovant. 90 Specifically, the
court accepted the following inferences: Shahar lacked discretion
and good judgment such that she was incapable of the profession-
alism required by the position; 191 Shahar had special personal in-
terests, and these interests would interfere with the efficient
workings of the Department; 192 and the public and Department
183. Id. at 1128 (Birch, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
184. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-35.
185. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1128 (Birch, J., dissenting). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 62-72 (discussing statutory and constitutional prohibitions against dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation).
186. See id. at 1101, 1105-06, 1108, 1110.
187. See id. at 1110, 1111 n.27.
188. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
189. See id.
190. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) ("On summary
judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in such
materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the mo-
tion.").
191. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101, 1105-06, 1110.
192. See id. at 1101, 1108.
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personnel would assume that Shahar was engaged in criminal ac-
tivity (sodomy), which would be detrimental to the Department. 193
The court did not permit an inference that would have been favor-
able to Shahar: the Attorney General withdrew the employment
offer based on Shahar's sexual orientation.
194
1. Portrait of a Lesbian - Discretion
The court portrayed Shahar as a person too wild to be
trusted, who lacked discretion, good judgment and the ability to
keep confidences. 195 In contrast, Judge Godbold, in dissent, por-
trayed a person deeply devoted to the teachings of her religion and
the life of her synagogue, and committed to having her intimate
relationship recognized and sanctified through a religious cere-
mony. 196 The facts of the case tell us only that Shahar participated
in a wedding ceremony, and that she shared this information with
friends and associates. 197 What one infers from these facts is a
crucial matter in a summary judgment proceeding. 198 "If reason-
able minds could differ on the inferences arising from undisputed
facts, then a court should deny summary judgment."'199 In this
case, reasonable minds clearly could and did differ.
To the Attorney General and to the court, Shahar's commit-
ment ceremony was evidence not of her commitment to her part-
ner and her faith, but evidence of poor judgment.200 Her refusal to
secretly guard the status of her relationship was taken as evidence
that she lacked discretion, not only in regard to her relationship,
but generally and to the extent that the Attorney General deter-
mined her unfit to serve as an attorney in the Department.20 1 Be-
cause Shahar chose to share information about her personal life
with friends and associates, her ability to keep professional confi-
dences was suspect. These assessments of Shahar's professional
capabilities qualify as inferences drawn from undisputed facts, and
the court should have denied summary judgment on this ground.
Instead, the clear message of the court is that gay and lesbian
193. See id. at 1101, 1105, 1110.
194. See id. at 1110, 1111 n.27.
195. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1099-1111.
196. See id. at 1118-22 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 1100-01.
198. See Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir.
1992) (citing Mercantile Bank & Trust v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 750 F.2d 838, 841
(lth Cir. 1985)).
199. Id.




citizens can achieve legitimacy only by secretive living. Any ac-
knowledgment of one's sexual orientation or intimate relationship
will be considered a breach of discretion and evidence of poor
judgment. A reasonable expectation of privacy and discretion may
require employees to maintain some boundaries between their
personal and professional lives, and to refrain from discussing ex-
tremely personal details of their intimate relationships in the of-
fice or other public settings. It means, perhaps, not talking about
sex. But who ever imagined that discretion would mandate an
employee not reveal that she is in a life-long relationship or shares
a home with someone. A simple standard of privacy should not
dictate that one not speak the name of a partner or let a gender-
referenced pronoun slip. It is appropriate for the Attorney General
to expect a sense of privacy and require professional discretion.
But requiring a person to vehemently guard the common details of
every day life is too unreasonable a burden. For employees who
choose not to shroud themselves in a veil of secrecy and who ac-
knowledge the truth about themselves, inferences about profes-
sional capabilities of good judgment, discretion and confidentiality
should not be permitted.
2. The Set-Up - Shahar's "Special Personal Interest"
The court noted Shahar's "special personal interest" and al-
lowed an inference that Shahar could not act professionally in
matters of a "controversial" nature, namely, matters relating to
homosexuals. 202 In addition to the perceived conflict of interest re-
garding Georgia's enforcement of the sodomy law, the court as-
sumed that conflicts would arise around marriage licenses, paren-
tal rights, insurance coverage and other employment benefits for
gay and lesbian people. 20 3 Justice Tjoflat's concurring opinion
even went so far as to suggest that Shahar staged a "set-up" to ad-
vance her personal political agenda under the auspices of the De-
partment.204
The court's opinion piled inference upon inference: Shahar was
first assumed to have a special interest; it was further assumed that
such interest would present an insurmountable conflict of interest,
202. See id. at 1108.
203. See id. at 1105.
204. Id. at 1111 n.1 (Tjoflat, J., concurring). "The record in this case supports
an inference that the Attorney General withdrew Shahar's offer of employment
because he thought Shahar had 'set him up;' once ensconced in the Department...
she would use her position to advance a homosexual-rights agenda." Id.
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disrupt the Department and damage the Department's credibility.205
In her dissent, Judge Barkett objected to these presumed implica-
tions of Shahar's assumed personal interests.206
[E]ven if Shahar has a "special personal interest" in homosex-
ual rights, such an interest tells us nothing about its disrup-
tiveness to her work environment. Surely the Attorney Gen-
eral's office has lawyers who have a "special interest" in any
number of topics: abortion, school desegregation, affirmative-
action or rights for the disabled, for instance. When those is-
sues arise and the Attorney General is forced to take a view,
some attorneys may personally disagree with that view and
may even ask not to work on the matter, but that does not es-
tablish that those views have been disruptive to the office as a
whole.20 7
A Washington Times commentary provides examples of other
potential personal interests. 208 'lawyers routinely rise above per-
sonal creeds or behavior in their professional capacities. Janet
Reno, [A]ttorney [G]eneral of the United States, testified at her
confirmation hearings to moral scruples against the death penalty,
but promised to enforce capital punishment laws nonetheless. And
that promise has been fulfilled."20 9 The commentary rhetorically
questioned whether every black attorney in the California Attor-
ney General's office could be fired the day after an anti-affirmative
action measure was approved. 2 10 Could Jewish attorneys be as-
sumed to present conflict where student-initiated prayer in public
school was allowed, or male attorneys presumed to resist the en-
forcement of sexual harassment statutes? 2 11 A presumption that
Shahar has an insurmountable conflict of interest is no more le-
gitimate an assumption.
One might just as easily assume that the Attorney General
would resist enforcing Georgia's law against adultery. Michael
Bowers announced during his campaign for governor that he had
205. See id. at 1108 (discussing loss of morale and loss of cohesiveness in the
department, and the difficulties of Shahar moving from department to depart-
ment).
206. See id. at 1134 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
207. Id. at 1134 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (stating a conflict between a "special
personal interest" and a state's position is not a reasonable basis on which to ex-
pect disruption of a work environment).
208. See Bruce Fein, Commentary, Janus-Faced Justice, WASH. TIMES, June 10,
1997, at A14.
209. Id.; see also Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1129 n.7 (Birch, J., dissenting) ("Bowers
has no reason for believing that Shahar's personal conduct would affect her abilities
to ethically represent the state .... Lawyers are trained to be advocates of legal po-
sitions with which they may personally disagree.").




participated in a decade-long adulterous affair with a woman who
had been a Department employee. 212 Bowers himself could be said
to have a "special personal interest."213 As for the Attorney Gen-
eral's concern for a potential loss of morale and disruption within
the Department, his adulterous relationship with a subordinate in
the office arguably would have caused more internal disruption
and loss of confidence than Shahar's committed relationship with
someone who had no ties to the Department. Had the same stan-
dard been applied to everyone in the office, Bowers himself would
have been fired.214 Neither Bowers nor the court offered any ex-
planation why Shahar presented a greater threat to public credi-
bility and efficient administration than did Bowers himself.
The fact that Bowers never met with Shahar to inquire
whether she had political or personal interests which may present
conflicts, and, if so, how she planned to handle the conflict, did not
bother the court.215 Without investigation or evidence, Bowers
drew inferences about Shahar's professional capability to uphold
the state's laws and the Department's policies. 216 He assumed con-
flicts of interests for Shahar that were not assumed for others in
the Department.2 1 7 Furthermore, Shahar was presumed to be in-
capable of balancing her assumed political interests against her
professional responsibilities. 21 The court must not allow such in-
ferences in favor of the moving party on a motion for summary
judgment. 219
212. See id. The announcement came one week after the Shahar decision. See
id; see also Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 120 F.3d 211
(11th Cir. 1997) (requesting a rehearing based on Bowers' announcement). The
court, however, denied a rehearing because Shahar had an earlier opportunity to
learn of Bowers' adultery through discovery, and she had not expressly done so
based on an agreement between the parties to forego inquiry into the parties' sex-
ual history. See 120 F.3d at 213.
213. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101, 1105, 1111 n.17 (arguing that the public and
Department personnel could assume that she committed sodomy because Shahar
participated in a homosexual marriage); see Shahar, 120 F.3d at 213 (providing
that Bowers violated the adultery law by his own admission; no assumption re-
quired); Candidate in Georgia Discloses Own Adultery, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
June 6, 1997, at A21.
214. See Judging the Bowers Affair, ATLANTA CONST., June 17, 1997, at A20.
215. See Shahar, 114 F.3d. at 1106 n.18.
216. See id. at 1118-22 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
217. See id. at 1129 n.7 (Birch J., dissenting) (citing Moseley v. Esposito, No. 89-
6897-1 (Super. Ct. DeKalb Co.) (providing Bowers' argument that whether depart-
ment attorneys committed sodomy was irrelevant to their professional positions)).
218. See id. at 1104-05.
219. See United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (stating that on
summary judgment, the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts con-





Heterosexuals don't practice sodomy ....
-Senator Strom Thurmond 220
This is not a case about only homosexuals... all sorts ofpeople
do this kind of thing.
-Daniel C. Richman 221
Obscurity is part of what sodomy is, a means by which it at-
tains its social effects.
-Janet E. Halley 222
The notion of sodomy played heavily in the mind of Michael
Bowers and in the ruling of the court. Bowers had, after all, de-
fended Georgia's sodomy law against constitutional challenge, and
he had won.223 In the present case, the word "sodomy" is used at
least eighteen times in the court's opinion,224 and Bowers v. Hard-
wick is cited or referred to no less than six times. 225 In reading the
opinion, one might easily forget that this is not a sodomy case;
rather, it is an employment case in which no charge or admission of
sodomy existed.226 Yet the court based its decision on the inference
of sodomy and further assumptions about the implications of having
a sodomite on staff.2 2 7
The court reasoned that if the public believed Shahar to be a
sodomite, it would damage the credibility of the Department. 228 The
court explained that it is reasonable for people to think that a couple
who claims to be married engages in "marital relations," and that
"[s]odomy is an act basic to homosexuality." 229  'Ve acknowledge
that some reasonable persons may suspect that having a Staff At-
220. Senators Loudly Debate Gay Ban, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 1993, at A9.
221. Neil A Lewis, Rare Glimpses of Judicial Chess and Poker, N.Y. TIMES, May
25, 1993, at Al (quoting Memorandum from Daniel C. Richman to Justice Thurgood
Marshall on Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)).
222. Halley, supra note 38, at 1757.
223. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that criminal prose-
cution of homosexual sodomy does not violate substantive due process).
224. See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1101, 1104-05, 1105 n.17, 1108, 1110,
1110 n.25 (11 th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998).
225. See id. at 1099 n.2, 1104-05, 1105 n.17, 1108, 1110 n.25. See generally su-
pra text accompanying notes 44-52 (discussing Hardwick's holding, which upheld
Georgia's law prohibiting homosexual sodomy).
226. See id. at 1099-1101 (focusing primarily on Shahar's homosexual relation-
ship rather than the details of the revocation of her employment offer).
227. See supra Part II.A.
228. See Shahar, 114 F.3d. at 1108 (discussing the conflict between Shahar's per-
sonal interest and the state's upholding of the lawful prohibition of homosexual sod-
omy).
229. Id. at 1105 n.17 (citing Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1357 (9th Cir.
1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), vacated, 875 F.2d 699 (1989)).
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torney who is part of a same-sex 'marriage' is the same thing as
having a Staff Attorney who violates the State's law against homo-
sexual sodomy." 230 This reasoning begs a number of questions.
First, why is sodomy basic to homosexuality but not to hetero-
sexuality? The court relied on the authority of one circuit court
judge who proclaimed "[s]odomy is an act basic to homosexuality."231
Assuming this matter to be undisputed, the Shahar court further
assumed that people would equate Shahar's sexual orientation with
criminal acts of sodomy and that such thinking would harm the De-
partment.232 But the equation of homosexuality and sodomy is not
undisputed. Studies show that heterosexuals are as likely to prac-
tice sodomy as homosexuals. 233 Furthermore, Shahar presented
studies showing that lesbians prefer non-sodomy sexual practices. 234
A reasonable trier of fact could find that homosexuality does not in-
dicate a propensity to engage in sodomy and conclude that sodomy is
not basic to homosexuality. Evidence exists to support Shahar's
case, and "a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff
on the evidence presented." 235
The second question that must be asked is why a staff attor-
ney's sex life is being scrutinized at all. Bowers himself argued in
Moseley v. Esposito236 that the sexual activities of the Department's
staff are irrelevant.237 Whether staff attorneys violate Georgia's
sodomy law "has nothing to do with professional impropriety, but
rather is wholly irrelevant .... " 238 If Bowers' position that whether
his staff engaged in sodomy was irrelevant to their professional posi-
tions, then why does sodomy play such a crucial role in this case?
Shahar was scrutinized differently than other Department attor-
neys. Yet the court refused to acknowledge even the possibility that
this differential treatment was based on Shahar's sexual orientation
230. Id. at 1105 n.17. The sodomy law has since been declared unconstitutional.
See infra note 276 and accompanying text.
231. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1105 n.17 (citing Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1357
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting)).
232. See id.
233. See supra note 38.
234. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1127 n.4 (Birch, J., dissenting).
235. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
236. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1129 n.7 (Birch J., dissenting) (citing Moseley v.
Esposito, No. 89-6897-1 (Super. Ct. DeKalb Co.)).
237. See id. (Birch J., dissenting) (citing Moseley, No. 89-6897-1) (discussing the
prosecution's charge of heterosexual sodomy and the defendant's futile effort to
seek discovery as to whether any of the department's attorneys had ever violated the
sodomy law).
238. Id. (Birch J., dissenting) (citing Moseley, No. 89-6897-1).
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and accordingly dismissed her equal protection claim. 239
Finally, what if Shahar had not married? Would the court still
assume that she engaged in "marital relations"? If Shahar had
stated that she was involved in a lesbian relationship, but said
nothing about a marriage, would the court have refrained from an
inference of sodomy? Would Bowers have agreed that Shahar's sex
life, like the sexual activities of other Department attorneys, was ir-
relevant to her professional position? It is highly unlikely the case
would have been argued or decided differently if Shahar had been
open about her intimate relationship but had refrained from mar-
riage. It is more likely that the idea, "sodomy is basic to homosexu-
ality," would have been applied to any homosexual relationship, not
just one in which a wedding ceremony occurred. If any homosexual
relationship is suspect, the suspicion is obviously based on sexual
orientation, and an equal protection claim should be allowed to pro-
ceed.
The equation of homosexuality and sodomy should not have
been allowed in this case. No evidence of sodomy existed. Refer-
ences to sodomy appeared only by unsupported assumptions and in-
ferences. 240 The issue was not whether the Attorney General was
reasonable in assuming the public would infer acts of sodomy. The
real issue was what inferences would be allowed in a court of law,
and in whose favor would inferences be allowed in a summary
judgment decision. The court simply and blatantly employed infer-
ences of sodomy, a red herring, to inappropriately dismiss Shahar's
constitutional claims.
C. The Basis Of Bowers'Decision - Status Versus Conduct
Throughout the opinion, the court maintained that the De-
partment terminated Shahar's offer, not because of her sexual ori-
entation, but because of her conduct. 241 By employing the status-
239. See id. at 1111 n.27; supra Parts II.B.2.b-c.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 205-07.
241. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1107 n.21, 1110-11 (11th Cir. 1997) (providing that
Shahar's "conduct" consisted of the following: her marriage to another woman in a
wedding ceremony performed in her synagogue, the exchange of rings, a change of
names, co-ownership of a house and a joint insurance policy with her partner).
The most significant conduct on which the opinion hinged was Shahar's candor,
her refusal to remain closeted about her sexual orientation. See id. at 1105, 1107,
1107 n.21. The court stressed Shahar's openness about her marriage, referring to
her "decision to 'wed' openly--complete with changing her name-another woman (in
a large 'wedding')." Id. at 1105 (emphasis added). The court treated any expression
of Shahar's sexual orientation as conduct, in essence "hanging coming-out speech on
the 'conduct peg."' Bruce, supra note 38, at 1159.
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conduct distinction,242 the court accomplished several feats. First,
the court rid itself of the Romer v. Evans243 prohibition of discrimi-
nation based on stereotypes and animosity, and justified its reli-
ance on Hardwick's244 proscription of "homosexual sodomy."
245
Second, the court denied the possibility that Bowers' treatment of
Shahar could have been based on her sexual orientation. 246 In a
single footnote at the end of the opinion, the court dismissed Sha-
har's equal protection claim, stating only that Shahar failed to
produce sufficient evidence the job offer was withdrawn because of
her sexual orientation. 247
The court apparently saw a bright line separating the fact
that Shahar participated in a lesbian marriage and the fact that
she is a lesbian.248 Dissenting Judge Birch refers to the majority's
reliance on conduct as "a distinction without a difference." 249 "It is
a matter of simple logic that only [homosexuals] would enter into a
[homosexual] marriage. Bowers' action, therefore, draws a distinc-
tion that, on its face, reaches homosexuals only and distinguishes
among similarly situated people on the basis of one trait only: that
they are homosexual."250
Only homosexuals were assumed to have a conflict in uphold-
ing the state's sexual conduct laws. Bowers does not assume "that
an unmarried [heterosexual] employee who is openly dating... has.
.committed fornication .... Nor... does he apparently assume
242. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
243. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
244. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); see supra text accompanying
notes 44-52.
245. Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1110, 1110 n.25. The court stated that "Romer is about
people's condition; this case is about a person's conduct," and "Bowers v. Hardwick...
was similarly about conduct." Id. at 1110, 1110 n.25. But the court's analysis in dis-
tinguishing Romer, Hardwick and Shahar was flawed. The court stated that "Romer
is no employment case," but conveniently overlooked the fact that Hardwick is not an
employment case either. Id. at 1110. And Romer is arguably more relevant to em-
ployment discrimination against sexual minorities than Hardwick: the government
act in question in Romer v. Evans forbid anti-discrimination measures, including
measures prohibiting employment discrimination. 517 U.S. at 620. Bowers v. Hard-
wick, on the other hand, was about sodomy, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and Shahar is not
a sodomy case. Finally, the Shahar court relied on the fact that Romer was about
government as sovereign, rather than an employer, but failed to admit that Hardwick
was also a government as sovereign case. See 114 F.3d at 1110 n.26. None of the
reasons the court cited for its reliance on Hardwick rather than Romer stand up un-
der scrutiny.
246. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1111 n.27. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
247. See 114 F.3d at 1111 n.27.
248. See id. at 1110.
249. Id. at 1127 n.2 (Birch, J., dissenting).
250. Id. (Birch, J., dissenting).
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that married [heterosexual] employees could well have committed
sodomy."251 Certainly he did not assume a conflict for heterosexual
married employees who committed adultery, that is, he did not as-
sume a conflict of interest for himself.252 Heterosexuals, whether
married and monogamous, married and adulterous, or single and
dating, were completely exempt from assumed sexual behaviors and
conflicts of interests. The court only distinguished and scrutinized
homosexuals. 253
This scrutiny raises equal protection concerns, 254 and the court
should have allowed Shahar's claim to proceed. 255 Whether Shahar's
conduct or her sexual orientation motivated Bowers' decision is a
question of fact and should not have been dismissed in a summary
judgment proceeding. 256 The court's insistence that insufficient evi-
dence existed to allow an inference that Shahar's orientation may
have been a factor is hardly believable, especially given the extreme
latitude the court allowed for inferences to be drawn in favor of
Bowers.257 The court simply employed an artificial distinction of
conduct and status to deny that Shahar's orientation had any rele-
vance in Bowers' decision to terminate her employment.
The court's own reasoning, based on the status of homosexu-
ality, provides further evidence of the falsity of the court's reliance
on conduct. 258 The court's presumption that a homosexual person
engages in sodomy is itself a presumption based on status.259 The
court's insistence that Bowers did not act based on sexual orienta-
tion would be more convincing if the court was able to recognize its
own reliance on sexual orientation. When one's conduct is inferred
251. Id. at 1128-29 (Birch, J., dissenting).
252. Bowers admitted to a decade-long adulterous affair. See supra text accom-
panying note 212.
253. See id.
254. See id. at 1127-29 (Birch, J., dissenting).
255. See supra Part II.B.2.b-c.
256. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1115-16, 1116 n.9 (Tjoflat, J., concurring) ("A rea-
sonable trier of fact could find from the record in this case that the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision was motivated not by the fact that Shahar is a homosexual, but be-
cause she and her partner were maintaining an open homosexual relationship.").
257. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101, 1105-06, 1108, 1110. Judge Birch com-
mented, "I find it difficult to understand how we can seriously contend that an in-
ference of discrimination on the basis of homosexual status cannot be made." Id.
at 1127 n.2 (Birch, J., dissenting).
258. See id. at 1105 n.17.
259. See id. The court relied on the opinion of a circuit court judge who declared
that "[slodomy is an act basic to homosexuality." Id. (citing Watkins v. U.S. Army,
847 F.2d 1329, "1357 (9th Cir. 1988) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting), vacated, 875 F.2d
699 (1989)). "Homosexuality" refers to one type of sexual orientation. See 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 867 (Stanford H. Kadish ed., 1983).
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from one's orientation, it is disingenuous to claim that orientation
played no role in the decision-either Bowers' decision or the
court's.
26 0
In the final analysis, the real distinction is not homosexual
status versus conduct; the crucial distinction is between homo-
sexuality and heterosexuality. It is irrelevant whether an attack
on Shahar's constitutional rights was based on her status as a les-
bian or her participation in a lesbian marriage. What is relevant
is that a heterosexual's right to expression stemming from her
sexual orientation would have been protected, and Shahar should
have been afforded the same protection. The court would not per-
mit inferences of illegal sexual activity, poor judgment and conflict
of interest 261 for a heterosexual who participated in a heterosexual
marriage. The invisible norm of heterosexuality must not be used
to discredit sexual minorities and to deny them constitutional pro-
tections guaranteed to all.
D. The Politics Of Marriage - A Political Act Only For
Sexual Minorities
Shahar: But I'm not really married.
The Court: Yes you are. And if you're not, you might as well be.2 62
In justifying the Attorney General's decision, the court em-
ployed a public versus private distinction. 263 Shahar argued that
her conduct was personal, not political; her expression was private,
not public.264 She further asserted that her wedding was a per-
sonal, private and religious affair. 265 Shahar did not claim to be
married in a civil or legal sense, and she affirmatively disavowed a
right to employee benefits for her partner.266 Shahar asked the
court to consider that "[she] took no action to transform her inti-
mate association into a public or political statement,"267 but the
court maintained that Shahar's marriage was a public and political
260. See supra note 257; Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1125-29 (Barkett, J., dissenting)
(discussing whether the employment decision was based on status or conduct).
261. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1101, 1105-06, 1108, 1110.
262. Id. at 1106-07. "If Shahar is arguing that she does not hold herself out as
'married,' the undisputed facts are to the contrary.... Even if Shahar is not married
to another woman, she, for appearance purposes, might as well be." Id. at 1107.
263. See id. at 1106-07.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 1124 (Kravitch, J., dissenting); id. at 1119 (Godbold, J., dissent-
ing) (citing Shahar v. Bowers, 70 F.3d 1218, 1225 (1995)).
266. See Shahar, 114 F.3d at 1106, 1124 (Kravitch, J., dissenting).
267. Id. at 1106 (citation omitted).
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act for which the Attorney General might reasonably have termi-
nated Shahar's employment. 268
There is something truly bizarre about a lesbian plaintiff, who
has identified herself as married, arguing against the existence of
any civil, legal or political ramifications of the marriage while the
court argues the marriage's significance. One has the sense that the
scripts have been handed to the wrong players. But perhaps this re-
sult is rather unsurprising when one considers that the court arbi-
trarily imposed a fictitious distinction. The question of whether
marriage is personal or political cannot be answered based on any
intrinsic characteristic of marriage, but only in the context of a soci-
ety that allocates benefits to certain groups (people in heterosexual
marriages) and withholds those same benefits to others. Only per-
sons in the dominant group have the luxury of living private lives.
This phenomenon can be seen in a variety of contexts, includ-
ing marriage, housing and voting. When a White family moves into
a wealthy White neighborhood, it would generally be considered a
private action without any particular political ramifications. It
would likely be unnoticed. But when a Black family breaks the color
line and moves to the mostly White, wealthy neighborhood, that act
is invariably thrown into the public discourse of integration and, all
too often, the accompanying political discourse of rising crime rates
and declining property values.
Earlier this century both women and Blacks were kept from
the ballot box.269 When persons in these groups finally gained and
exercised their right to vote, that action was a political activity be-
yond the political nature of voting itself. Blacks and women not only
participated in the political process of voting: there was an addi-
tional political element in exercising one's right of citizenship
against the powers that would deny that right. In this context, al-
most any action of a minority becomes an action against the oppres-
sive force-not because of the inherent nature of the act, but because
of the discriminatory force against which the act is initiated.
When a heterosexual couple marries, they are presumed to be
engaging in a private, and perhaps religious, endeavor. There is no
political element to a wedding ceremony, the exchange of rings or a
name change. Nor is there anything overtly political about joint
268. See id. at 1107.
269. Women gained the right to vote in 1920 through ratification of the Nine-
teenth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. While Black males attained the
right to vote in 1870, U.S. CONST. amend. XV, Jim Crow laws and practices kept
many from the ballot box, as evidenced by the need for the passage of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1994).
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home ownership and insurance policies, except to the extent that the
legal classification of marital status gives rise to certain economic
benefits. When a gay or lesbian couple marries, however, they are
not afforded the luxury of remaining within the private realm. Al-
though Shahar believed she engaged in a deeply personal and relig-
ious act, in effect she "lived in a fish bowl and thus had no private
reality whatsoever."270 The court declared Shahar's marriage a po-
litical act and used it to bolster the Attorney General's concerns re-
garding that act's public ramifications.
V. Conclusion And Recommendations
In Shahar v. Bowers, the court used the public-private distinc-
tion to displant Shahar's personal life into the public arena and
thereby justify infringement upon her rights to intimate and expres-
sive association.27 1 Shahar's candor and expressive conduct were
declared separate from her identity as a lesbian in the court's at-
tempt to circumvent an equal protection challenge to classification
based on sexual orientation. 272 The court accepted inferences and
conclusions based solely on prejudice and ignorance. In summary,
the court exercised its discretion to protect these prejudices rather
than protect Shahar's rights of intimate and expressive association,
religious expression and equal protection.
Courts hearing cases involving sexual minorities should not
exercise discretion as did the Shahar court, but rather should con-
sider the following recommendations. First, governmental interests
based on animosity or disapproval toward social groups should not
be tolerated. Private prejudices are not legitimate bases for gov-
ernmental action and must not be allowed to prevail.
Second, courts must not impose an additional burden on gay
men and lesbians to prove their relationships deserve protection un-
der the First Amendment guarantee of intimate and expressive as-
sociation. A cause of action must not be dismissed for a homosexual
association if the same claim would be allowed for a heterosexual as-
sociation. When a claim is not dismissed and the court weighs the
plaintiffs interest against the governmental action that would in-
fringe upon that interest, the court must not afford less value to a
same-sex relationship than to any other relationship.
Third, courts should not allow the inference that homosexuals
270. Amy D. Ronner, Amathia and Denial of "In the Home" in Bowers v. Hard-
wick and Shahar v. Bowers: Objective Correlatives and the Bacchae as Tools for
Analyzing Privacy and Intimacy, 44 U. KAN. L. REV. 263, 307 (1996).
271. See supra Part IV.D.
272. See supra Parts II.B.2, IV.C.
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engage in criminal sodomy while ignoring the possibility that het-
erosexuals may also violate sodomy laws. Inferences based on
stereotypes and unsupported by factual evidence must not be per-
mitted. Furthermore, sexual orientation should not be used to im-
plicate conduct. Permissible conduct, such as a religious wedding
ceremony, should not implicate impermissible conduct, such as
criminal sodomy.
Finally, courts must not frame issues in a case as issues of
"conduct" in order to dismiss free speech and equal protection
claims. Coming-out speech is an expression of one's identity and is
entitled to First Amendment protection. Courts must not deny this
protection by treating speech as "conduct." Nor should courts ob-
scure a classification based on sexual orientation because the plain-
tiff spoke of her orientation and expressed a commitment to her
partner through marriage. "Homosexual conduct" should not bar an
equal protection claim any more than "female conduct" would bar a
claim based on gender classification. When homosexual citizens are
treated differently than heterosexual citizens, a valid claim of im-
proper classification exists.
Unfortunately, as long as sexual activity is criminalized, dis-
crimination is permissible and same-sex relationships are not ac-
corded legitimacy, courts are free to use their discretion against sex-
ual minorities. Statutory changes are necessary to ensure that gay
and lesbian citizens will find justice in the courts. The following rec-
ommendations outline the minimum statutory changes required so
that lesbians, gay men and bisexuals may exchange second class
status for full citizenship.
First, sodomy laws must be repealed. Sodomy laws not only
criminalize sexual activity, they also "serve as the legal basis for the
regulation of . . . lesbian and gay life generally" and are used
"against lesbian and gay litigants in nearly every possible legal con-
text."273 If adult consensual sexual activity is illegal for gay and les-
bian citizens, they will not find equality in the courts, even for non-
sexual issues such as discrimination in the workplace.
Second, anti-discrimination statutes are necessary to protect
sexual minorities against discrimination in employment and other
civil matters. Human rights statutes protect citizens against dis-
crimination based on animosity or bias on account of race, national-
ity, gender and religion. As recognized in some jurisdictions, dis-
crimination based on animosity toward homosexuals is similarly
harmful. As long as discrimination is permissible, lesbians and gay
273. Rubenstein, supra note 15, at 19.
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men will retain second-class status.
Finally, same-sex relationships must be given equal status
with heterosexual relationships through legal and civil recognition
of domestic partnership and marriage. Laws proscribing same-sex
marriage are not consistent with constitutional guarantees or with
statutes prohibiting discrimination based on gender or sexual orien-
tation. Anti-marriage laws deny gay and lesbian couples the same
rights, privileges and responsibilities afforded other couples. "Until
homosexual couples are permitted the opportunity to enjoy the legal
status of marriage, they will never gain equality."274
The values and policy considerations that underlie these judi-
cial and legislative recommendations are consistent with other le-
gitimate governmental concerns about marriage and families, dis-
crimination in civil matters, and constitutional guarantees of speech,
expression, association and equal protection. The policy considera-
tions favoring marriage, fidelity and financial interdependence for
heterosexual couples are equally relevant to gay and lesbian couples.
Discrimination based on animosity and bias is detrimental to society
and to the individual, regardless of whether the discrimination is on
account of race, religion, gender or sexual orientation. Rights to free
speech and expression are the same whether one reveals a hetero-
sexual, homosexual or bisexual orientation. Rights to intimate and
expressive association do not depend on the gender of the associat-
ing parties.
The sexual orientation of citizens must not determine whether
constitutional guarantees are applicable or whether discrimination
is permissible. This Article's recommendations, stemming from an
analysis of the Shahar v. Bowers court improperly granting sum-
mary judgment, recognize that sexual minorities must be ensured
full citizenship, with guarantees of freedom of speech and expres-
sion, intimate and expressive association, and equal protection un-
der the law.
Epilogue
On November 23, 1998, the Georgia Supreme Court declared
the state's sodomy law unconstitutional. 275 The court examined
"whether the [state's] constitutional right of privacy screens from
governmental interference a non-commercial sexual act that oc-
curs without force in a private home between persons legally capa-
274. Sharon Ehzabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies-Identity and
"Passing" Race and Sexual Orientation, 13 HARV. BLACKLETER J. 65, 92 (1997).
275. See Powell v. State, No. S98A0755, 1998 WL 804568 (Ga. Nov. 23, 1998).
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ble of consenting to the act."276 The court stated: "We cannot
think of any other activity that reasonable persons would rank as
more private and more deserving of protection from governmental
interference than consensual, private, adult sexual activity,"277 and
concluded "that such activity is at the heart of the Georgia Consti-
tution's protection of the right of privacy."278
If Shahar v. Bowers279 were decided today, would the Elev-
enth Circuit find Attorney General Bowers' decision to terminate
Shahar's employment offer reasonable? The court's decision was
based on the notion that people would assume Shahar violated the
criminal prohibition against sodomy, and those assumptions would
cause internal disruption to the Office and damage the credibility
of the Department.280 Now, with no sodomy law to be violated, the
assumption of Shahar's law breaking could not stand.
If Shahar v. Bowers were decided today, would the Eleventh
Circuit rely so heavily on Bowers u. Hardwick,28' in which the
United States Supreme Court held the Georgia sodomy law did not
violate one's right to privacy under the federal constitution? While
Bowers v. Hardwick may still be "good law" in federal court, per-
haps with the Georgia sodomy statute declared unconstitutional by
the Georgia Supreme Court, Hardwick and all that it stands for




279. 114 F.3d 1097 (11 Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998).
280. See id. at 1105.
281. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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